.
Finally, in keeping with their putative desire for transparency with regard to this work, the NSA established a Venona web site through which the entire collectton of documents can be viewed. 1 use the term "putative" advisedly because, despite (or perhaps because of) the generosity of such an abundant release, there is as yet neither an index for the collection of data in Venona nor one for the entire corpus of approximately 3,000 documents from the Venona project. The absence of a master index allows availability without ease of access. An alphabetical list of all the codenames with the NSA'S correlated given names and the pages on which those names occur would provide evidence of frequency of mention in the Venona documents, and frequency might provide one indicator of relative activity and/or importance of persons identified as being engaged in espionage.
Venona is divided into three parts of unequal length. The shortest, although by no means the least important, is the prefatory gloss to die entire volume, composed of a one page "Foreword" written by William P. Crowell, Deputy Director of the NSA, a 33 page "Preface," a two page list of abbreviations and acronyms, and an eight-page chronology. This front material serves two functions. First it attempts to establish the intellectual authority and scholarly authenticity of the work through the formal apparatus of academic writing. Second, it frames the documentary material in the remaining two sections within a specific ideological context. That context is most easily discernible from the chronology, a list of dates that relate to the Venona material. It begins with the first debriefing of Walter Krivitsky (identified as a "Soviet intelligence defector") on 10 January 1939 and ends in 1957, with the following three items: Haynes and Klehr go some way to remedying this deficiency by providing in one of their appendices an alphabetical list of 349 names of persons (US citizens and others) "who had a covert relationship to Soviet intelligence that is confirmed in the Venona traffic." Haynes and Kehr, Decoding Soviet Espionage, 339. The list includes both codenames and real names. Footnotes direct the reader to endnotes which provide references to the relevant intercepts. Despite its usefulness, this method of correlation of names and documents does not provide easy means for assessing relative frequency of mention.
Benson and Warner, Venona, xliv.
In terms of die ideological perspective that informs Venona, this conjunction of events is revealing. The Smith Act had nothing to do with acts of espionage. It criminalized forms of speech, that is, it made it illegal to teach and advocate (and to conspire to teach and advocate) the violent overthrow of die American government. The Supreme Court, in Yates v. US, advanced a strict tnterpretation of die First Amendment, a position that Benson and Warner describe as a serious smpediment in the fight against domestic subversion in that it requires evidence of overt acts as distinct from speech about acts (i.e., advocacy). To include the Yates v. US decision, along with the accompanying explanation of the difficulties that decision apparently created in dealing with American Communists, in the final portion of a list of alleged espionage and subversion creates the impression, implicit throughout Venona, ,hat the CPUSA was an organizatton devoted to espionage. It suggests, further, that the singular failure of various government security agencies in the period covered by Venona to arrest and convict many Amerrcan Communists for espionage activities was not because of die insufficiency or absence of evidence against diem, but because the Supreme Court was soft on Communists. Besides embodying die ideological predisposition of the volume and die project, this finger pointing is also a strategy for avoiding accountability. After SO years of decoding, decryption, translation, and investigation, the tangible results of die Venona project are remarkably dun. One way to underssand the NSA'S insistence that die work of die Venona project did not benefit from computer technology, but was achieved by a labour intensive, time-consuming iterative process of layered decoding that took many years, may be to mitigate dûs embarrassing fact. Reinforcing diis view of die Venona project as requiring herculean human effort, all the Venona documents, bodi in die volume and die website, ,iiat ts, all 3,000 messagess are reproduced from typescript most of which appears to have been composed on manual typewriters. material. The juxtaposition of these documents with the Venona intercepts nevertheless creates an interpretative field that enhances the credibility of both sets of material. By virtue of their proximity to the Venona material, the us government documents urging greater attention to espionage take on an inferential prescience, credibility, and validity. That the US government had serious concerns about domestic spying gives added importance to the Venona intercepts.
The third and longest part of the volume is composed of selected Venona decrypts (99 in all), which are purportedly among "the most significant and revealing Soviet messages translated by Western analysts." The 99 documents are prefaced by a note on translation, which is a list of 10 words and phrases the editors characterize as "specialized Soviet intelligence terminology," a jargonized code for the Russian espionage cognoscenti (and an intended verbal barrier for the uninitiated) incorporated into the plain text. There is, finally, a list of the 99 translated messages and, in italics, the editors' notations of the names security agency cryptologists associated with each message. Nowhere in Venona is there an explanation of how and why the cryptologists linked each codename with a real name, and why and how, in some cases, the cryptologists concluded that real names were being used radier than codenames There is no discussion of why some codenames changed and others did not. Since so much of the interest in these documents hinges on these identifications, the absence of explanation is a serious lacuna.
The importance of this omission is in part occluded by the instant impact of viewing such honest-looking documents. The releases appear as if they had just been removed from secret government files. Albeit crossed out, many still bear the legible notation "Top Secret." Parts apparently too dangerous for the eyes of ordinary readers are completely blocked out. Many of the messages are incomBenson and Warner, Venona, back cover. This list of definitions creates precise and stable meaning for such crucial wordd as "fellow countrymen." Benson and Warner define that term as meaning "members of the local Communist Party," Benson and Warner, Venona, 192, but it could just as plausiblb be read as a catch-all phrase for those with Communist sympathies however shaded. The counterrevisionist argument that American communists were engaged in extensive espionage activity on behalf of the Soviet Union is strengthened by the NSA's naarow and unambiguous definition of "fellow countrymen." The intercepts themselves, however, do not appear to require such fixed meaning.
Benson and Warner explain that the release of these intercepts "involved careful consideration of the privacy interests of individuals mentioned," but this claim is difficult to aasses without knowing what names are concealed, Benson and Warner, Venona, , 91 . What is clear is that the privacy interests of some appear to be dealt with differently from those of others. For example, consider the intercept "New York 1657 to Moscow, 27 November 1944." The codename METR is associated with both Joel Barr and Alfred Sarant, and so could be either. Benson and Warner, Venona, , 31 . Despite the encertainty, both hames sre provided. Likewise, in "Washington [Naval-GRU] 2505-12 to Moscow, 31 December Warner's Venona in 19%, the communiqués were decoded and reworked using an iterative process that involved re-writing as new material was decoded.
The complex history of that revisionary process -as perceived errors were corrected, slightly different words added or subtracted, that is, the whole messy business of translation and editing of texts -is almost entirely suppressed. A concern about how words and phrases were selected is important because even small changes of words can alter the meaning of these documents enormously. If, for example, instead of "recruited," the messages said "met," it would undermine the notion that a spy ring was being formed. What if "bonuses" carried with it the sense of "charitable donation" or "contribution"? What if "bonus" had no fixed meaning? That concern is occasionally reflected in the notes, as when, ,n a footnote in "Washington [Naval-GRU] 2505-12 to Moscow, 31 December 1942," a translator points out that "MATERIAL is often used in the sense of ' documentt ' or ' documentary material,'" but, in the context of this intercept, "appears to mean 'information'." In die same set of notes, there is the comment that "KhoZYaJSTVO is very difficult to translate out of context. It can mean 'economy', 'farm', 'establishment', 'household'." Such formal acknowledgements of the uncertainties of translation are rare.
A related question involves the order in which the releases were translated and read. Although the documents in their present condition are arranged chronologically, they are, in fact, the end result of a lengthy process that did not proceed chronologically. The documents, for the most part, carry only two dates, the date the message was sent, and another date that is unexplained, but which may be one of the dates (presumably the last date) die message was worked on. There is no record or notation on the Venona messages of all the dates on which the partial decryptions and translations were made, footnotes added or amended, and names confirmed. There is no indication of who worked on which documents. The absence of this information from the messages reproduced in Venona tends so encourage a perception of stability and certainty about the plain text that a more heavily annotated version, with its accumulated evidence of choices made, might not so readily convey.
The concern about die chronology of the decryption and translation is not only about the way the appearance of authenticity and authority is constructed; it is also about how me NSA developed its version of the Rosenberg story. Given the need to find a spy ring to justify me Venona project, it is crucially important to ensure mat the desire for certain readings to exist did not help to create those readings. It would therefore be helpful to know that me documents mat are now beeng presented Benson and Warner, Venona, 211. as precursors to die arrests of Fuchs, Gold, Greenglass, Sobell, and die Rosenbergs were all translated in die form diey now appear before die arrests. Otherwise, it can be argued that die arrests influenced die translations of die Venons releases. Most of the Rosenberg traffic is not, however, concerned with details of domesticity. Of the nineteen Rosenberg related messages, several that were not included in Venona concern the acquisition and use of cameras, which were 0Benson and Warner, "New York 1657 to Moscow, 27 November 1944, "Venona, 381.
What the Venona Decrypts
Ethel is also referred to in Benson and Warner, "New York 1340 to Moscow, 21 September 1944." Venona, 341. The relevant passage states: "LIBERAL and his wife recommend her [Ruth Greenglass] as an intelligent and clever girl." Like all the other intercepts, the two involving Ethel Rosenberg are vague and suggestive, not clear and definitive. Does this remark mean that at a meeting of both Rosenbergs and the KGB agent, Ethel explicitly recommended her sister-in-law to participate in atomic espionage for the Russians? Or does this remark mean that Julius met with the Russians and told them that he (and, by the way, his wife) agreed that his sister-in-law was "an intelligent and clever girl," presumably a code for his sister-in-law's usefulness in some unspecified espionage activity. Despite the intentional obscurity of these intercepts, they are used by counter-revisionist historians to justify the conviction and execution of Ethel Rosenberg. Haynes and Klehr, for example, take these two intercept references to Ethel as evidence corroborating the version of the Rosenberg case offered by the Greenglasses at the trial in which Ethel was "fully aware of Julius's espionage work and assisted him by typing some material," Haynes and Kehr, Decoding Soviet Espionage, 309. Later, in one of their appendices, Haynes and Klehr expand Ethel's guilt by stating that she "assisted in recruiting her brother and sister-in-law." (363) Neither of the two Venona intercepts concerning Ethel Rosenberg says anything about her recruiting her brother. Clearly, there is no Venona text that does not require the reader to interpret and thereby to create a master narrative to give meaning to the plain text. In itself, "New York 1340" does not prove that Ethel recruited Ruth. It tells us nothing at all about her alleged recruitment of her brother David Greenglass. unavailable in New York and had to be purchased in Mexico and posted back to the United States. Of the twelve KGB messages in Venona, ,ulius Rossnberg most often appears in relation to the recruitment of friends (Albert Sarant) and relatives (Ruth Greenglass). What they are recruited for is not explained. Despite the seemingly pointless message about Ethel, it is difficult to imagine that the KGB would be busy transmitting in encrypted code reports on totally innocuous activity. Those who appear in the KGB traffic are presumed to be guiity of something.
As corroboration of guilt, there are a few messages in the Rosenberg collection connected to die payment of bonuses. These not only point a finger of wrongdoing at those receiving such payment, they also advance the main theme of Venona, that Americans were willing (if not totally cost free) tools of die KGB. Document 55, New York 1314 to Moscow, 14 September 1944 "William Perl, again, , is typical of this motif:
Until recently GNOM was paid only the expenses connected with his coming to Tyre. rudging by an appraisal of the material received and the rest [1 group garbled] sent by us GNOM deserves remuneration for material no less saluable than that given by the hest of the members of LIBERAL'S group who were given a bonus by you. Please agree to paying him 500 dollars.
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GNOM, we are told, is William Perl and LIBERAL is Julius Rosenberg. "The material received" is never specified. What "the rest [1 group garbled]" refers to remains undefined. The names in this message (and elsewhere in Venona) are clear; the actions, typically, are a blur. Although the contexts in which Rosenberg, Greenglass, Sarant, and Perl are discussed suggest they are not innocent, what they are guilty of is never stated.
We are invited by the NSA and the CIA to accept the Venona traffic as definitive evidence that a Rosenberg spy ring existed. Whatever Julius Rosenberg was engaged in, nowhere in these documents do we find die corroboration that he committed "die crime of the century," die theft of die secret of the atomic bomb. transferred to the Soviets, the messages convey the appearance of guilt without the certainty. There is always the possibility that some, much, most, or all the information that Julius supplied to the Soviets was not secret; in that case, he might have been engaged in unauthorized technology transfer but not necessarily in espionage.
Aside from being married to Julius, apparently knowledgeable about his work and a recommender of Ethel's sister-in-law as clever, Ethel stays at home and does no work at all. Moreover, there are other messages, unrelated to the Rosenbergs, that point to a scientist working at Los Alamos, codenamed MLAD, who provided the USSR with information about the atomic bomb. At what point the government began to suspect MLAD'S activity is unclear, MLAD has been identified as Theodore Hall, and, unlike the Rosenbergs, he has acknowledged that he passed information regarding the atomic bomb to the Russians, MLAD was never charged or arrested.
If the Venona documents are accepted at face value, as the uncensored communication between KGB agents working in the United States to their counterparts in Moscow, then what they tell us is that, if there was atomic espionage, it was not Ethel and Julius Rosenberg who were engaged in it. If, moreover, the Venona intercepts were the basis for the arrest, trial, and execution of the Rosenbergs, as is now alleged by the FBI, then it is not farfetched to suspect that Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were framed, a position that has been advanced by Morton Sobell, die Rosenberg children, and Walter and Miriam Schneir, among others.
Venona as a Counter-Revisionist Response to the Rosenberg Case
Naturally enough, the Venona project and its interest in the Rosenbergs did not come from political terra incognita, nor did it fall on virgin political soil. The release of the Venona decrypts is embedded in an ongoing debate about the nature of the Cold War, and needs to be understood as justifying and advancing the official version of that period as its history continues to be scrutinized and contested from a variety of revisionary perspectives. In other words, whatever the status of its truth claims, the documents and the publication are part of a political debate, framed by a particular reading of the recent past, and brought forth in the mid-to-late 1990s in a way that reinforces that reading. 
READING THE ROSENBERGS 201
Although die stated goal of the Venona project was to provide a panoramic view of Soviet espionage in the United States during the 1940s, the early release of the Rosenberg messages provides strong evidence that the NSA and the CIA were especially concerned with influencing the way the Rosenberg case is now being interpreted. By die time of the Venona releases, in drama, poetry, art, and, most dazzlingly, in such fiction as E.L. Doctorow's The Book ofDaniel and Robert Coover's The Public Burning, the Rosenbergs were enderstood to ob eictims so the Cold War whose guilt has never been established and whose punishment far outweighed any crime they may have committed.
In the domain of scholarly prose and commercial non-fiction, die findings are more divided. Over time, two positions on die Rosenbergs have evolved, each with its own variations and modulations. On die one hand, diose who accept official history judge die Rosenbergs guilty of having passed die secret of die atom bomb to the Russians, even though they were charged with conspiracy to commit espionage, a distinction of major legal import in terms of die rules of evidence. On die other hand, revisionist historians, civil libertarians, and others argue that die Rosenbergs were convicted by the hysteria of die time, that diere were many procedural irregularities in their trial, and that their sentence was unnecessarily harsh because they had not been proven guilty, or because they were innocent, or because what they (and especially Ethel) were convicted of did not warrant die death penalty.
By die early 1970s, as revisionist American history was gaining ascendancy in die academy, this second version of die Rosenberg case threatened to topple die official view. The Rosenberg children, Michael and Robert MeeropoL, began a long and convoluted process, not yet complete, of extracting all die files related to their parents from die FBI and other agencies of government undee rie then newly enacted Freedom of Information Act. To date, this effort has not produced die smoking gun to prove conclusively that die Rosenbergs were framed, and it may have been naive to expect that such definitive evidence now (or ever) exists in a format that does not require interpretation. Nevertheless, research using die material released under Freedom of Information requests confirms and amplifies die contention that there ^Tie most famous of the works of art responding to the Rosenberg case is Picasso's idealized line drawings of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, which were used on picket signs at demonstrations in Europe and North America tt protest the execution of the eosenbergsg Edgar L. Doctorow, The Book of Daniel (New York 1912) . In 1913, the novel was made into a film, Daniel, directcd by Sidney Lumet and starring Timothy Huttout Lindsay Crouseo and Mandy Pattnkin.
Robert Coover, The Public Burning (New York r976). For an analysis of the differences in law between the rules of evidence required in a conspiracy charge and the rules of feidence eemanded in n case in which an overt eriminal act must be proven, ,ee Mallolm Sharp, Was Justice Done? (New York 1956) . were significant procedural irregularities that prevented the Rosenbergs from receiving a fair trial.
Central to a revisionist reading of the Rosenberg case is the work of Walter and Miriam Schneir, whose book, Invitation to an Inquest, appears both in hardback and paperback, thus making it, unlike previous studies of the Rosenberg case, available to a mass market. Moreover, it bears the hallmark of respectability, mainstream commercial publishers, starting with Doubleday who put out the first 1967 edition and ending, in 1983, with a fourth edition published by Pantheon. The thesis the Schneirs persuasively advance in all editions is that the Rosenbergs were framed and convicted of a crime that did not take place. In their 1983 edition, the Schneirs incorporate into their argument material obtained from government files under the Freedom of Information Act. They also address the persistent rumors that began circulating from about the time of the Rosenberg execution, of important evidence, suppressed for reasons of state, that, if released, would prove the Rosenbergs guilty. They note that, despite repeated FBI claims of a "Rosenberg spy ring," the Justice Department made no arrests, and that a Justice Department report concedes that "investigation of all logical leads has, so far, failed to produce any appreciable results." 44 The Schneirs further note that, "in early 1957, the Department of Justice abandoned the entire project.' 45 Not unreasonably, the Schneirs interpret the failure to make arrests as evidence that there was no spy ring. The Schneirs end their 1983 edition by linking the Rosenberg case to the Dreyfus case. Implicit in the analogy is a belief that, like Dreyfus, the Rosenbergs were innocent, and deserve exoneration.
In 1983, the same year as the Schneirs' fourth edition of Invitation to an Inquest appeared, Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton published their study of the Rosenberg case, The Rosenberg File: A Search for Truth. Using previously unavailable material, primarily from FBI files released under the Freedom of Information Act, Radosh and Milton spruced up and modernized the official version of the Rosenberg case. At the time of its publication, this work was heralded as definitive. The reasons for such acclaim are easy to find. The book is crisply written, and finds fault both with the government's handling of the case (in particular, the use of Ethel Rosenberg as a lever to extract a confession from her husband) and with the Rosenbergs' diehard communism. Thus Perhaps the most controversial element in the Radosh and Milton work is their reliance on the FBI reports of a jailhouse informer, Jerome Tartakow, who told the FBI that Julius Rosenberg, while in prison, had confessed his guilt to Tartakow. Radosh and Milton, Rosenberg File, . Pessen concluded that the work "falls far short of being a reliable, let alone definitive, book on the subject." As the United States moved to the right in the 1980s and 1990s, the concerns of Pessen and many of the other participants in this exchange did not gain the hearing they warranted.
By 1983, then, the Schneirs and Radosh and Milton had provided each side of the Rosenberg controversy with analysis and information sufficient to encourage further debate without, however, delivering die long-awaited knockout punch. Between 1983 and the release of the Venona messages, the Soviet Union collapsed. There was, at that time, a strong expectation that the files of the KGB would be opened and unsettled issues like the Rosenberg case would, in all likelihood, be resolved. The wished for research cornucopia did not, however, materialize. And, if it had, it would undoubtedly have provoked the same kinds of questions about authenticity and provenance that the Venona messages elicit.
What followed within Russia was a vast dislocation that left employees and former employees of many state agencies unemployed, underemployed, and/or poverty-stricken. Some KGB agents (whether real or alleged is hard to know) cottoned on (or were nudged along by academic entrepreneurs) to the value of the confessional mode in the west, and rushed into print with "revelations." Such information needs to be understood at least in part as a supplementary retirement package for incomes made meager by the demise of the Cold War and the USSR. This is not to say that what these Soviet agents have to say is valueless; it is just that knowing how to evaluate such interventions requires care. Perhaps the best example of the difficulties with the Russian "tell all" genre is the book by Pavel and Anotoly Sudoplatov entitled Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness -A Soviet Spymaster, published in 11994 , aittle morr ehan a year before the release of the first Venona documents. In a chapter on "Atomic Spies," the Sudoplatovs accuse four leading atomic physicists associated with the Manhattan Project, (Neils Bohr, Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard, and J. Robert Oppenheimer), of having supplied vital information about the atomic bomb to the Soviet Union. As to the Rosenbergs, according to the Sudoplatovs, they were very minor players. Here were entirely too many spies, and the wrong ones to boott .n terms sf resolving questions about the Rosenbergs, then, the Sudoplatov comments were useless. Indeed, the controversy created by the Sudoplatov "revelations" made it clear that information emanating from Russia would not automatically be seen as reliable, much less persuasive. This, then, was the state of play regarding the Rosenberg case at the time of the first Venona releases. 
Case Closed? Hand Wringing, Triumphalism, and Academic Distancing
The initial impact of the Venona releases can be gauged by the shift in the position oftbeSch IK1 rs.Wnting m 77,e^n 0 ,magazmc I nAugu S tt995,,cssthanamonth after the first Venona releases, the Schneirs replace their belief in the innocence of the Rosenbergs with a distressed acceptance that "during World War Π Julius ran a spy ring composed of young fellow Communists, including friends and college classmates whom he had recruited." They then comment on the failure of the Venona releases to corroborate the evidence used against the Rosenbergs during their trial: there were «^odrawmgoflemmolds.mjskrtchof'meaaombomb itself,f no Jell-0 box recognition device or password using Julius's name -in short, none of the testimony^essential in convicting Julius is verified." Since the Venona releases do not confirm the evidence offered at the trial, and since the evidence of the trial was shaky to begin with, the Schneirs' original argument that the Rosen bergs were framed stiUretains its persuasive power. But they take no comfort in the solidity of their basic position. Tlie force of the Venona releases is nowhere more apparent than in the Schneirs' highly emotive concluding remarks. In their penultimate paragraph, they say that they now believe thTleadership of the American CbLnristPartyknew about, and by implication condoned espionage a position that is the cornerstone of counter-re4ionist histories of the Cold War They base their conclusion on a Venona document dated 5 It is difficult to see how this incomplete and incomprehensible communication can be used as confirmation of anything. Nevertheless, the Schneirs bestow on this message more coherence and intelligibility than even the NSA was prepared to give it; it was not included in the Benson and Warner Venona, ,upposedly containing the most important of the Venona intercepts.
They end, lamely, with a wringing of hands: "This is not a pretty story," they say.
54 "We know that our account will be painful news for many people, as it is for «What is particularly surprising is that the Schneirs express no interest in how these mterceptsc^m.othcposL ;i onofth eU n 1 teddu 1 .e S governmcn,a,at lm ewhen,hcSov l et Union was its ally in WorW War II. If the Soviets were spying on the Americans, the Americans were most assuredly spying on the Soviets. Tl« situation appears to be not so very different from that reflected in the Mad Magazine seriese "Spy vTspy. If the Schneirs' initial response to the release of the Venona documents was a premature capitulation, the response of Radosh and Milton was undisguised triumphalism. In 1997, under the prestigious imprimatur of Yale University Press, the second edition of The Rosenberg File appeared, virtually unchanged from its first edition. A new introduction positions the work in relation to the material that has appeared since the first edition in 1983, and in particular to the Venona releases. Radosh and Milton make no attempt to address the serious concerns about documentation, accuracy, and selectivity raised by the reviewers of their first edition.
For Radosh and Milton, the Venona releases represent the final word on the Rosenberg case. In their opinion, the documents demonstrate conclusively the guilt of Julius, who, "far from being a political dissenter prosecuted for his espousal of peace and socialism ... was an agent of the Soviet Union, dedicated to obtaining military secrets." What exactly it means to be "dedicated to obtaining military secrets" they do not say. Does someone so "dedicated" conspire to commit espionage, or does that person actually commit espionage, or does that person, perhaps, do nothing at all except believe that obtaining secrets for the USSR might be a good idea?
Julius Rosenberg was charged with a specific crime, conspiracy to commit espionage, and in particular, amongst the overt acts, of having conspired with David and Ruth Greenglass to steal atomic secrets and transmit them to the Soviet Union. With their choice of the word "dedication," Radosh and Milton remove the need for any evidence of an overt act. "Dedication" criminalizes a state of mind.
And what of Ediel? Even if Julius was guilty of conspiring to commit espionage, Ethel was not. But the logic of "dedication" makes Ethel guilty too. The subtext of the Radosh and Milton position proceeds: (1) since American Communists were dedicated to espionage, and (2) Communists, it follows that (3) both Julius and Ethel were dedicated to espionage. Radosh and Milton conclude:
The decision to prosecute Ethel Rosenberg on a capital charge, in an effort to put pressure on her husband, is hardly surprising. Although we continue to feel that the use of the death penalty in this context was improper and unfair, die Venona releases show that, overall, our justice system functioned with integrity under trying circumstances.
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The brutality and shallowness of this judgement compromises die Radosh and Milton work. Their caveat about unfairness is a throwaway line. They know that Julius was executed before Ethel. Julius died without providing the government with names of his alleged accomplices; once Julius was dead, how could the government possibly justify the execution of Ethel? If she were no longer a lever and was executed anyway, then me machinery of state was guilty not only of fabricating evidence to convict her, but of murder. How these circumstances illustrate the integrity of the American justice system as Radosh and Milton contend is unclear. Notwithstanding such concerns, Radosh and Milton's work has become as foundational a text for such subsequent counter-revisionist studies of the Cold War as Haynes and Klehr's influential and highly regarded Venona.
Although Radosh and Milton regard their work "as the most careful and balanced assessment of this important episode in the early Cold War era," it is, like all other studies of the recent past, provisional in nature, subject to critique, deconstruction, and revision. That process has already begun. Ellen Schrecker's Many Are The Crimes: McCarthyism in America uses the Venona releases in a more critical and judicious manner than do either the Schneirs or Radosh and Milton. Like them, she accepts their authenticity. But unlike them, she queries several of their underlying assumptions. For example, she wonders about the importance of the espionage. "Was the espionage, which unquestionably occurred, such a serious threat to the nation's security that it required the development of a politically repressive internal security system?" she asks. Her answer is that it did not. She notes that not all espionage activities were equally serious, and not every piece of information that found its way to the Soviet Union was a military secret. Finally, she points out that "the KGB officers stationed in the United States may have been trying to make themselves look good to their Moscow superiors by portraying some of their casual contacts as having been more deeply involved with the Soviet cause than they actually were." Nevertheless, Schrecker's assessment of the Rosenberg case is heavily indebted to her reading of the Venona releases:
The Venona releases also show that the KGB was ... pleased wiih Jullus Rosenberg and his work. According to these documents Rosenberg, a mechanical engineer, was an active agent who recruited about ten of this friends, CCNY classmates ... into an espionage ring ....The documents do not identify all of Rosenberg's people, but the ones they do, like Joel Barr, Alfred Sarant, Max Elitcher, Michael Sidorovich and William Perl, have long been connected to the case. During the war these scientists and engineers gave Rosenberg information about the weapons they were working on that he then photographed and handed to thh KGBB Here she derives from the Venona releases a clarity and specificity that they simply do not have. The releases do not say that all of these classmates of Julius Rosenberg (those identified by name and those, after fifty years of investigation, still unknown) passed information to him about the weapons they were working on.
Precisely because the Venona documents are so vague they invite readers to play "connect the dots" and superimpose on these disconnected and incomplete communications a narrative continuity that derives not from their intrinsic meaning, but from prior knowledge of the Rosenberg story. In other words, when Schrecker says that "the Venona documents ... show," what she means is that if the Venona documents are read in relation to already existing versions of the Rosenberg case, then they illustrate the case. Take, for example, Schrecker's acceptance of the spy ring, a group supposedly made up of Joel Barr, Alfred Sarant, Max Elitcher, and others. Schrecker says she finds it credible that the Venona documents associate these men with Julius Rosenberg's spy ring because they have long been connected to the Rosenberg case. It is not necessarily that their names in the Venona documents confirm their role in the Rosenberg story, but the other way round. It is just as possible that because Barr, Sarant, Elitcher, and the others were friends and classmates of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, they were sucked into the investigation and, once implicated, they were assumed guilty by their past associations. They were then available to have their real names correlated with code names, particularly since the code names have few identifying particulars. As I have argued earlier in this paper, without further clarification about when the Venona releases were translated, die correlation between real and code names may well have been established after rather than before the arrest of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, in which case the names in the Venona releases cannot be used as corroboration of a spy ring.
So reading the Rosenbergs after Venona is not very different from reading the Rosenbergs before Venona, except that the revisionist approach to the case has been temporarily muted by an increasingly noisy right-wing counter-revisionism. Even so, the official version of the Rosenberg case continues to unravel. There is general agreement that the process of decoding was complex and difficult Indeed, the code has not yet been completely broken since components of varying length within the supposedly decoded messages are still not decoded. As I understand the process from a conversation with an NSA spokesperson in 1999, the messages were in Roman letters because American telegraph services would not transmit material in any other form. These letters correlated to numbers, which in turn correlated to Cyrillic letters. The Cyrillic letters presumably were combined into Russian words, which were then encrypted by me interpolation of random units. These messages, decoded and decrypted, men had to be translated into English. It taxes credibility to believe that the production of English plain text versions of the Venona intercepts are entirely accurate.
As well as inaccuracies of translation, there is always the potential for errors of transmission. Did those supplying information to the KGB always communicate complete and unvarnished truth? Did the KGB agents always understand the information they were receiving? And, finally, did they always transmit that information accurately, given that they too had to code and encrypt data? Take, for example, one of the first messages translated by American cryptographers. The intercept "New York 1699 to Moscow, 2 December 1944" provides a list of seventeen scientists engaged in "the problem," that is, American atomic research: Fifteen of those mentioned were involved in the American atom bomb project. Two of them, Werner Eisenberg and Strassenman, had no connection with the project. Eisenberg was, according to West, actually Werner Heisenberg, who not only was not involved in the American project, but was the 1932 Nobel Prize winner in physics who remained in Germany during World War II. Eisenberg and Strassenman are mistakenly linked to the other fifteen either by the informant or by the KGB agent. What such an error demonstrates is that the Venona documents need to be read cautiously and critically. This concern about textual accuracy would obtain even if there were no ideological predisposition by the employees of the NSA to read this material in a particular way.
Scrutiny of text is one way in which the Venona messages may be reassessed; study of context is another. The Venona messages need to be read in relation to FBI and other US government agency files; they also need to be read in relation to KGB and other Russian government files. One of the great mysteries of Venona is that, through William Weisband, who worked on Venona and was thought to be a Soviet agent, and Kim Philby, who was a Soviet agent and, according to Benson and Warner, "received actual translations and analyses [of the Venona material] on a regular basis," the Soviets knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that their codes were broken. So why did they continue to use them? Finding the appropriate contexts to answer this and the other questions provoked by the Venona intercepts will undoubtedly influence not only how the Venona intercepts are read, but also how the Rosenberg case is understood. Without those contexts, the Venona material and what it is supposed to tell us about the Rosenbergs must be approached with great caution. 
